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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
TRAVIS BEN HARDING, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 970390-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 
78-2a-3(2) (e) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred under Rules 404(b) and 
403 in allowing the introduction of evidence concerning the 
arrest warrant and Harding's post-arrest statements concerning 
other drug deals? 
"The admission of evidence under Rule 404 is a question of 
law that we review for correctness. However, the trial court's 
subsidiary factual determinations should be given deference by 
the appellate court and only be overruled if they are clearly 
erroneous." State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1009 (Utah App. 1994) 
(citations omitted). The standard of review for decisions under 
1 
Rule 403 is as follows: "When reviewing a trial court's decision 
to admit evidence under Rule 403, we assess whether, as a matter 
of law, the trial court acted reasonably in striking the balance" 
between the probative value of the evidence against its potential 
for unfair prejudice. State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 699 n.5 
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993). 
This issue was preserved in a pre-trial motion and again at 
trial (R. 45-51; Tr. at 192-93). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
RULE 403, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
RULE 404(b), UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not 
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to 
show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, 
or absence of mistake or accident. In other words evidence 
offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for 
a non-character purpose and meets the requirements of Rules 
402 and 403. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Travis Ben Harding appeals from the judgment, sentence and 
order of Probation by the Honorable Ray M. Harding on May 23, 
1997, after a jury trial at which Harding was convicted of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a 
second degree felony. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Harding was charged by information filed on or about 
November 18, 1996, with Possession of Methamphetamine in a Drug 
Free Zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated Section 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i) (R. 1). 
Prior to trial, Harding filed, pursuant to Rules 403 and 
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, a Motion in Limine to 
exclude evidence of Harding's prior convictions, evidence of the 
arrest warrant which led to this charge, and Harding's post-
arrest statements (R. 45-51). On April 9, 1997, Judge Harding 
issued a memorandum decision in which he granted Harding's motion 
with respect to evidence of prior criminal behavior except to 
impeach specific statements by Harding should he testify at trial 
(R. 54-55). The trial court denied Harding's motion as to his 
post-arrest statements and to evidence regarding the outstanding 
warrants which resulted in Harding's arrest and this drug charge 
(R. 54-55). 
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On April 10, 1997, a jury trial was held and Harding was 
convicted as charged (R. 117-119). On May 23, 1997, Judge Ray M. 
Harding sentenced Harding to thirty-six months probation and 
ordered him to serve 270 days in the Utah County Jail and to pay 
a fine/surcharge of $1,850.00 (R. 124-25). 
On June 23, 1997, Harding filed a Notice of Appeal with the 
Fourth District Court and this action followed (R. 127). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On October 24, 1996, Clark J. Nielsen, a detective with the 
Pleasant Grove Police Department, served an arrest warrant on the 
Defendant, Travis Harding/Travis Martin at Rick's Auto (Tr. at 
186-88). Nielsen hand-cuffed Harding and transported him to the 
Pleasant Grove Police Department where Harding was instructed to 
remove his personal property from his clothing (Tr. at 189-90). 
Harding emptied out the pocket in his coat and removed a 
pack of cigarettes and a small plastic bag that contained "a 
white powder substance" inside (Tr. at 190-91). Nielsen 
testified that as Harding removed items from the coat pocket, he 
appeared to be "concealing something or attempting to" (Tr. at 
190). Nielsen also testified that he did not notice the bag 
initially, but saw it only after moving the cigarettes (Id.). 
Nielsen asked Harding what the bag was and Harding replied that 
"he didn't know" (Id.). Later Harding told Nielsen that the 
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baggie was placed in the coat by his girlfriend, Gina Thayer (Tr. 
at 211). Still later, a female called Nielsen and indicated to 
him that the baggie was not Harding's (Tr. at 211-12). Nielsen 
testified that field tests indicated that the powder substance 
coating the lining of the bag with a more detectable amount at 
its bottom was methamphetamine (Tr. at 191-92, 205) . 
Nielsen testified that Harding "became very emotional" when 
the substance tested positive for methamphetamine (Tr. at 192). 
Harding told Nielsen that "he didn't want to go to jail. He said 
that he would work with me..." (Tr. at 193). Nielsen testified 
that Harding also told him that "he knew of a lot of different 
illegal activity, stolen guns and drugs, that he was very aware 
of or had knowledge of that he could hook me up with so that I 
could give him a break on the criminal charges, because he didn't 
want to go to jail" (Tr. at 193).1 Harding was then transported 
to the Utah County Jail for the arrest warrant (Tr. at 193). 
Nielsen also testified that he was informed by Harding that 
papers and the cigarettes that were found in the coat pocket 
belonged to Harding's girlfriend, Gina Thayer (Tr. at 208-09). 
Harding also indicated to Nielsen that he smoked one brand of 
cigarette's and Thayer smoked a different brand (Tr. at 211). 
Warding renewed his objection to the introduction of these 
statements under Rule 404(b) and was overruled. 
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Nielsen testified that there was nothing about Harding's 
appearance or behavior that would cause him to believe that 
Harding was under the influence of narcotics at the time of his 
arrest (Tr. at 216) . 
Jennifer McNair, an employee at the State Crime Laboratory, 
testified that she analyzed the powdered substance removed from 
Harding's coat for the Pleasant Grove Police Department (Tr. at 
230-31). McNair testified that she performed four tests on the 
substance and identified it as amphetamine and methamphetamine 
(Tr. at 232). McNair described the amount in the bag as "a 
minimal residue" (Tr. at 239, 240). 
Harding testified his birth name is Travis Ben Martin, but 
that he has been known has Travis Ben Harding his entire life 
because his mother married Mark Harding when she was pregnant 
with him (Tr. at 246). Harding testified that Thayer has been 
his common-law wife for ten years and that they have four 
children together (Tr. at 247) . 
On October 24, 1996, Harding, Thayer and one of their 
children were residing with Harding's grandmother, Addie Roundy, 
in Pleasant Grove (Tr. at 248). Harding testified that the 
leather coat he was wearing on October 24, 1996, when arrested at 
Rick's Auto initially belonged to him, but that he had given it 
to Thayer three weeks earlier (Tr. at 248-49). 
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Harding testified that earlier on October 24, 1996, Thayer 
wore the coat out on errands with Harding's grandmother (Tr. at 
249-50). While they were gone, Harding received a telephone call 
from Rick's Auto about his car which was being repaired (Tr. at 
250). When the ladies returned, Harding's grandfather drove 
Harding to Rick's Auto (Tr. at 250-51). Before leaving the 
house, Harding saw the coat hanging in the kitchen and put it on 
(Tr. at 251). 
While at Rick's Auto, Harding was approached by Detective 
Nielsen and placed in handcuffs (Tr. at 252). Nielsen then 
started asking Harding about the car and asked him about a 
fraudulent inspection (Id.). Harding testified that he was then 
frisked by Nielsen, who pulled articles—including cigarettes the 
plastic bag—out of his pocket (Tr. at 253-54). Harding told 
Nielsen that he did not know what was in the bag (Tr. at 254). 
Nielsen then removed two knives from Harding's person (Id.). 
Harding testified that his cigarettes and lighter were in his 
back pocket and Thayer's cigarettes were in the same pocket as 
the baggie (Tr. at 255). 
Harding testified that at the Pleasant Grove Police 
Department, he did not attempt to hide the baggie (Tr. at 257). 
Harding testified that he did not know that the baggie was in the 
coat pocket prior to the time that he went to Rick's Auto (Id.). 
Harding testified that he saw no loose particles in the baggie 
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that appeared to be powder; and that he told Nielsen that the 
baggie was not his (Tr. at 257-58). Finally, Harding testified 
that he did not know that he had methamphetamine residue under 
his control at the time he was arrested and that he believed that 
the baggie was a "wrapper with mud on it" (Tr. at 259, 273). 
Andie Roundy, Harding's grandmother, testified that on 
October 24, 1996, she went with Thayer on some errands to get a 
birth certificate for Harding and Thayer's daughter (Tr. at 281). 
Roundy testified that Thayer was wearing a dark leather coat 
which she had been wearing on a regular basis although it 
belonged to Harding (Tr. at 282). Roundy testified that Thayer 
had some papers and her brand of cigarettes in the coat pocket 
(Tr. at 283). 
After returning from errands, Roundy testified that Thayer 
took off the coat and hung it on a chair by the door in the 
kitchen (Tr. at 284). Shortly afterwards, Harding picked-up the 
coat and wore it to go with her husband to Rick's Auto (Tr. at 
284). When Harding returned, he told Roundy and Thayer what 
happened and gave Thayer her cigarettes and papers (Tr. at 285). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in admitting evidence of the arrest 
warrant and Harding's post-arrest statements concerning other 
"illegal activity" under Rule 404(b) and Rule 403 of the Utah 
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Rules of Evidence. Under either rule, any probative effect of 
this evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect on 
Harding's credibility and its rousing the jury to overmastering 
hostility towards Harding. Absent the introduction of such 
evidence, there was a reasonable likelihood that Harding would be 
acquitted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE ADMISSION 
OF EVIDENCE AS TO THE ARREST WARRANT AND HARDING'S 
POST-ARREST STATEMENTS CONCERNING OTHER ILLEGAL ACTIVITY 
UNDER RULES 404(b) AND 403 
Prior to trial, Harding filed a Motion in Limine to exclude 
the admission of evidence concerning the arrest warrant which led 
to the drug charge at issue here as well as Hardingfs post-arrest 
statements concerning other illegal activity2 (R. 45-51). The 
trial court denied Harding's motion with regards to both the 
arrest warrant and Harding1s post-arrest statements (R. 54-55). 
The trial court concluded that Harding's post-arrest statements 
"are probative as to his intent to commit the crime charged... 
20fficer Nielsen initially came in contact with Harding because 
of an arrest warrant. After the contents of the plastic bag which 
was found in the pocket of Harding's coat field tested positive for 
methamphetamine, Harding indicated to Nielsen that "he didn't want 
to go to jail. He said that he would work with me. . /' (Tr. at 
193) ; and that Nxhe knew of a lot of different illegal activity, 
stolen guns and drugs... that he could hook me up with so that I 
could give him a break on the criminal charges..." (Tr. at 193). 
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[and that] the probative value of the statements outweighs any 
danger of unfair prejudice" (R. 54). Harding asserts that the 
trial court erred in admitting this evidence under both Rule 
404(b) and Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
A. The trial court erred in admitting evidence of the arrest 
warrant and Harding's post-arrest statements under Rule 
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, addresses the 
admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts: "Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character 
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In other words 
evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant 
for a non-character purpose and meets the requirements of Rules 
402 and 403."3 
"The basis of these limitations on the admissibility of 
evidence of prior crimes is the tendency of a fact finder to 
convict the accused because of bad character rather than because 
he is shown to be guilty of the offenses charged." State v. 
3The last sentence of this rule was added in 1998 with the 
comment that it "abandons the additional requirements for admitting 
evidence under Rule 404(b) imposed by State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 
484 (Utah 1997)." 
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Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985). Moreover, evidence of 
other crimes committed by the defendant "is not admissible if the 
purpose is to disgrace the defendant as a person of evil 
character with a propensity to commit crime." State v. Daniels, 
584 P.2d 880, 881 (Utah 1978). 
The trial court erred in allowing the introduction of the 
arrest warrant. There was no necessity for the evidence. It was 
not probative of a material issue of possession of a controlled 
substance. The warrant was not proof of "motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge [or] identity." Harding's 
credibility was critical with respect to the element of knowledge 
and intent. The fact that he was wanted for other criminal acts 
prejudiced his credibility with the jury. 
Similarly, the trial court erred in allowing the admission 
of Harding's post-arrest statements concerning other "illegal 
activity, stolen guns and drugs" (Tr. at 193). Contrary to the 
trial court's decision, Harding's statements were not "highly 
probative of" the element of intent. They simply demonstrated 
Harding's shock at the discovery of the methamphetamine and his 
natural desire to avoid incarceration. The admission of the 
statements could only inflame the jury's prejudice against 
Harding by causing the jury to believe that Harding knew and 
associated with drug dealers on a regular basis. 
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Accordingly, because of the prejudice suffered by Harding 
because of the admission of this evidence, and because neither 
the warrant or Harding's statements were "highly probative of a 
material issue", Harding asks that this Court reverse the 
decision of the trial court to admit this evidence under Rule 
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
B. The trial court erred in admitting evidence of other illegal 
activity under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Should this Court find that Harding's post-arrest statements 
concerning his ability to supply the police with information of 
other "illegal activity" does not qualify as evidence of other 
bad acts under Rule 404 (b), or should this Court conclude that 
evidence of the arrest warrant and Harding's post-arrest 
statement are admissible under Rule 404(b), the evidence still 
should have been excluded under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
Rule 403 reads: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." This Court 
reviews a decision to admit evidence under Rule 403 under an 
"abuse of discretion" standard. State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 698, 
699 n.5 (Utah App. 1993), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 ("We assess 
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whether, as a matter of law, the trial court acted reasonably in 
striking the balance" between probativeness and prejudice). 
In relation to the issue of prejudice, this Court has 
stated, ''Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has a tendency to 
influence the outcome of the trial by improper means or if it 
appeals to the juries sympathies or arouses its sense of horror, 
provokes its instinct to punish or otherwise cause a jury to base 
its decision on something other than the established propositions 
of the case." State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App. 1992), 
cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). 
Factors to be considered "when a court balances the 
probativeness of evidence against its prejudicial effect" include 
"the need for the evidence" and "the degree to which the evidence 
probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility." 
O'Neil, 848 P.2d at 701 (quoting State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 
296 (Utah 1988)). 
In this case, the State had no need for the admission of the 
arrest warrant or Harding's post-arrest statements concerning his 
desire to work with the police in exchange for leniency. The 
trial court gave no reason for the admission of the arrest 
warrant and the trial court erred in finding the post-arrest 
statement to be probative of intent. Moreover, the trial court 
did not balance the admissibility of such evidence under Rule 
404(b) with its possible prejudice as required by Rule 403. 
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Any probative value of the statements was clearly outweighed 
by their prejudicial effect. Harding's credibility as to the 
element of knowledge/intent was central to the outcome in this 
case. The introduction of evidence which illustrated that 
Harding had past convictions and that he was well-acquainted with 
drug and gun dealers could only damage his credibility with the 
jury and "rouse the jury to overmastering hostility" against him. 
Accordingly, Harding asserts that the trial court committed 
reversible error in admitting evidence of the arrest warrant and 
Harding's post-arrest statements under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Harding respectfully asks that this Court conclude that the 
trial court erred in admitting evidence of the arrest warrant and 
Harding's post-arrest statements of other "illegal activity" 
under both Rule 404(b) and Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Therefore, Harding asks that this Court reverse the 
trial court and remand this matter to the Fourth District for new 
proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this PJ> day of May, 1998. 
argaret/ P. Lindsay )[ Ma] 
Counsel for Harding 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals 
Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor, 
P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this /fk day of 
December, 1997. 
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FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR i 
OF UTA1-''--' ^OFUiAh 
APR 71997 
CARMAd. SMITH, CLERK 
DEPUTY 
Christine L. Sagendorf (7612) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION 
Attorney for Defendant 
40 South 100 West Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: 379-2570 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TRAVIS BEN HARDING, 
Defendant. 
MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE 
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR 
CONVICTIONS, ARREST ON AN 
OUTSTANDING WARRANT, AND 
STATEMENTS MADE AFTER ARREST 
Case No. 961401599 
JUDGE RAY M. HARDING, SR. 
COMES NOW, the Defendant above named, by and through his counsel of record, CHRISTINE 
L. SAGENDORF, and hereby moves this court In Limine pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure to exclude evidence regarding the Defendant's prior criminal history, evidence 
regarding the warrant on which his arrest was effected, and evidence of Defendant's post-arrest 
statements. 
Respectfully submitted this *\ day of April, 1997. 
^CjteQSTINE IT. SAGENDORF 
Attorney for Defendant 
0045 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Motion in 
Limine to Exclude Evidence of Prior Convictions to C. Kay Bryson, 100 East Center, Suite 2100, Provo, 
UT 84606, this day of April, 1997. 
0044 
Fourth Jud.cia- Oistr i6t lCour 
of Utah County. State o t U U n 
C A R M A B. S M I T H , Clerk 
Deputy 
Christine L. Sagendorf (7612) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION 
Attorney for Defendant 
40 South 100 West Suite 200 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Telephone: 379-2570 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TRAVIS BEN HARDING, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE 
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR 
CONVICTIONS, ARREST ON AN 
OUTSTANDING WARRANT, AND 
STATEMENTS MADE AFTER ARREST 
Case No. 961401599 
JUDGE RAY M. HARDING, SR. 
The Defendant above named, pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
hereby submits the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion 
in Limine to Exclude Evidence. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
*• The defendant, TRAVIS BEN HARDING, is charged with Possession of Methamphetamine 
Drug Free Zone, a Second Degree Felony, resulting from allegations of the 24th day of October, 1996 
Defendant was arraigned and entered a Not Guilty plea before the Honorable Judge Lynn W. 
Davis on the 14th day of March, 1997. 
in a 
Trial by jury is scheduled for the 10th day of April, 1997. 005i 
4. Mr. Harding has one felony conviction for Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree 
felony. This judgment was entered by Judge Cullen Christensen on December 22, 1989. He also appears 
to have several misdemeanor convictions. Those convictions include: one count of Possession or Use of 
a Controlled Substance, a class B misdemeanor, on November 17, 1989; two counts of Attempted 
Aggravated Assault, both class A misdemeanors, on March 29, 1991; and one count of Assault on a 
Peace Officer, a class A misdemeanor, together with one count of Criminal Trespass, a class C 
misdemeanor, on June 7, 1994. One of the aforementioned assault charges was also prosecuted by the 
Federal Government and Mr. Harding was sentenced to Federal Prison pursuant to that charge. 
5. Mr. Harding was taken into custody on October 24, 1996 on a warrant out of Pleasant Grove 
which is unrelated to the present controversy. At the time he was booked, Mr. Harding made several 
statements to his arresting officer regarding contacts he had with drug suppliers and a theft ring. 
ARGUMENT 
I. EVIDENCE OF OR REFERENCE TO PRIOR ACTS BY THE DEFENDANT ARE 
INADMISSIBLE UNDER UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 404(b) AND 403. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has outlined the analysis in determining the admissibility of evidence 
of prior crimes, wrongs, or actions. First, the evidence must be admissible under Utah Rules of Evidence 
404(b). If the evidence is not admissible under that rule, the inquiry ends. On the other hand, if the 
evidence of prior conviction qualifies under 404(b), the court must then turn its analysis to whether the 
effect of admission would be more prejudicial than probative under Utah Rules of Evidence 403. State v. 
ONeiL 848 P.2d 694 (Utah App. 1993). 
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Utah Rules of Evidence 404(b) provides as follows: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 404(b). 
The Utah Court of Appeals has interpreted this section to mean that: "Rule 404(b) does not 
exclude evidence unless it fits an exception; rather, it allows admission of relevant evidence 'other than to 
show merely the general disposition of the defendant1". State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561 (Utah App. 1991) 
quoting State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134 (Utah App. 1989). Although motive, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident often provide the state with arguments for 
admission of evidence of prior actions, the relevancy of such evidence must go beyond a general attack of 
the defendant. The application of rule 404(b) makes clear that evidence of prior actions must be relevant 
as to the proof of an element of the crime charged to be admissible. "In sum, 'when evidence may 
establish constitutive elements of the crime of which the defendant is accused, in the case on trial, it is 
admissible even though it tends to prove that the defendant has committed other crimes." Taylor at 569. 
The Court in State v. Shickles held as follows: 
The general rule prohibiting evidence that a defendant committed other crimes was 
established, not because that evidence is logically irrelevant, but because it tends to skew 
or corrupt the accuracy of the fact-finding process. Indeed, Dean Wigmore has argued, 
"It is objectionable not because it has no appreciable probative value but because it has too 
much." [Citations omitted.] Thus evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible unless 
it tends to have a special relevance to a controverted issue and is introduced for a purpose 
other than to show the defendant's predisposition to criminality. 
Shickles 760 P.2d 291, 295 (Utah 1988), quoting 1A J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law 
§58.2 at 1212 (Tillers rev. 1983). 
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The Defendant asserts that evidence of his prior convictions, the fact that he was arrested on an 
outstanding warrant, and his post-arrest statements do not fall into one of the exceptions to 404(b). If 
404(b) does not provide for admission of the evidence, the inquiry concludes and the evidence is not 
admitted. However, if this Court determines that the evidence is admissible under that section, the 
analysis turns to Rule 403. Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that even if the Court finds 
that the evidence of another crime meets any of the criteria enumerated in 404(b) it may still be excluded. 
Rule 403 reads as follows: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 403. 
Defendant asserts that evidence of his prior convictions, the outstanding warrant on which his 
arrest was effected, and his post-arrest statements offer nothing in the way of evidence as to any element 
of the case before this Court. Consequently, the only possible value of evidence of prior convictions is to 
prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the jury. Absent any probative value, any prejudicial impact at all is 
sufficient to prevent admission of the evidence. 
In interpreting Rule 403, the court in State v. Saunders. 699 P.2d 738, 741 (1985), said 
"Evidence of prior crimes is presumed prejudicial..." The Court has further said, "Trial court's 
admission of a prior conviction because it was of sufficient probative value was improper because this 
rule requires the trial court to balance the probative value of the evidence against the prejudicial effect." 
Neither the Defendant's prior history nor any statements he made regarding those involvements serves to 
further a critical or material element of the crime charged. That being the case, the prejudicial effect 
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clearly outweighs any probative value and the evidence ought to be excluded for consideration by the 
jury. 
II. EVIDENCE OF OR REFERENCE TO PRIOR CONVICTIONS OF THE DEFENDANT 
ARE INADMISSIBLE UNDER UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 609. 
The defense also requests that the Defendant be allowed to testify in this matter without threat 
that evidence of prior actions being used to impeach his testimony. Defendant asserts that the reasoning 
for making the admissibility of another criminal convictions, as related in the previous section, so difficult 
is in deference to the defendant's constitutional rights. The Utah Constitution provides as follows: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appeal and defend in person 
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a 
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to have a speedy public t r i a l . . . . 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 12. (emphasis added). 
Defendant asserts that in order for another conviction to be admissible if the defendant elects to 
testify, the court must, under Rule 609, begin with the presumption that such information is more 
prejudicial than probative, and then the court must find that "the probative value of admitting this 
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect on the accused." Utah Rule of Evidence 403. "The basis of 
these limitations on the admissibility of evidence of prior crimes is the tendency of a fact finder to convict 
the accused because of bad character rather than because he is shown to be guilty of the offenses 
charged." Saunders 699 P.2d at 741. Consequently, ". . . absent a reason for the admission of the 
evidence, other than to show criminal disposition, the evidence is excluded." Saunders 699 P.2d at 741. 
Allowing evidence of prior bad acts to be admitted even for the limited purpose of challenging 
credibility presumes that anyone convicted of a criminal offense is less than trustworthy and chills the 
constitutional mandate that a criminal defendant may testify in his own behalf. A defendant faced with 
«
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addressing prior convictions and other past actions may well choose to forego testimony in order to 
insure that prejudicial evidence will not go to the jury. In so choosing, he is being denied a constitutional 
imperative even if he is the one exercising the choice. 
m. CONCLUSION 
In the instant case, the State will almost certainly seek to impeach the Defendant based upon his 
prior wrongs through admission of evidence regarding Defendant's criminal history, the warrant for his 
arrest, and through statements made to the arresting officer during the booking process. This evidence 
does not go to any element of the charged crime. Rather, it would be useful only to attack the Defendant 
generally and prejudice him in the eyes of the factfinder. Under the appropriate balancing test of Rules 
404(b) and 403, the evidence is clearly more prejudicial than probative. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant moves the Court to rule that evidence of his prior 
criminal convictions, his arrest warrant, and his post-arrest statements is inadmissible. 
Respectfully submitted this ^i day of April, 1994. 
CFHUSTINE L. SACgNDORF 
Attorney for Defendant 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs 
TRAVIS BEN HARDING, 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 961401599 
DATE: April 9, 1997 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
LAW CLERK: Christine Gerhart 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion in Limine. Having 
received and considered the Motion, together with memoranda in support of the Motion, the 
Court hereby grants in part and denies in part the Motion and delivers the following 
Memorandum Decision. 
Statement of Facts 
The defendant, Travis Ben Harding, is charged with Possession of 
Methamphetamine in a Drug Free Zone, a Second Degree Felony and is set for trial before 
this Court on April 10, 1997. The Defendant has an extensive criminal history, including 
prior convictions for Possession of a Controlled Substance, Attempted Aggravated Assault, 
Assault on a Peace Officer, and Criminal Trespass. The Defendant has served time on these 
convictions in the Utah County Jail, as well as a federal prison in Arizona. 
When the Defendant was taken into custody on October 24, 1996, he made 
statements to the arresting officer about his involvement and contacts with drug suppliers and 
a theft ring. The Defendant now requests this Court prohibit the use of these prior 
convictions and statements in the jury trial set for April 10. 
0055 
Opinion of the Court 
The Court agrees with the Defendant's assertion of Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence and will not allow any evidence of prior criminal behavior or convictions as 
character evidence to prove conformity therewith in the State's case in chief. The Court will 
also not allow any references to prior crimes for general impeachment purposes. However, 
the Court will allow the State to address the Defendant's prior criminal history to impeach 
specific statements of the Defendant should he choose to testify in his own behalf. In 
particular, should the Defendant testify that he has no knowledge of or involvement in drugs, 
the Court will allow evidence of his prior conviction to be introduced and the Defendant may 
be questioned about prior drug convictions on cross-examination. 
The Court denies the Defendant's motion as to the statements made to the arresting 
officer on October 24, 1996. An essential element of the offense of possession of 
methamphetamines is intent. The Court finds that the Defendant's statements are probative 
as to his intent to commit the crime charged. In addition, the Court finds that the probative 
value of the statements outweighs any danger of unfair prejudice. Evidence regarding 
outstanding warrants that resulted in the Defendant being in custody will be admitted relative 
to the statements made to the arresting officer. 
Order 
The Court hereby grants the Defendant's Motion in Limine with respect to evidence 
of prior crimes offered for general impeachment purposes. The Court denies the Defendant's 
Motion with respect to evidence of prior crimes offered for specific impeachment purposes, 
and with respect to statements by the Defendant to the arresting officer. 
DATED this 9th day of April, 1997. 
